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I. INTRODUCTION
The union of punitive damages and class actions can be aptly
described with Samuel Johnson’s famous quotation regarding
marriage: “The triumph of hope over experience.” 1 By most
conventional wisdom, there is little future for plaintiffs or
defendants who desire to resolve punitive damages claims globally
using the procedural vehicle of a class action. From a conceptual
perspective, however, there are circumstances under which the
union could function. This Article explores those possibilities, not
in the spirit of normative support, but in the spirit of exploring
theories that may have some prospective vitality.
Notwithstanding the chilly reception that punitive damages
class actions have received from appellate courts, there are several
approaches at the micro and macro levels of analysis suggesting
that “hope” is still persistent. By disaggregating the United States
Supreme Court punitive damages jurisprudence, it is possible to
identify a limited number of factual scenarios where a class action
for punitive damages could be successful. These micro-level
observations can constitute a road map for navigating the current
seemingly insurmountable barriers that have severely limited the
use of class actions in punitive damages claims. At the macro
level, there are two observations that could lead to a revision of
punitive damages class actions: the seemingly undaunted,
pragmatic desire on the part of trial judges to resolve similar cases
collectively, and the powerful support for an economic vision of
punitive damages that leads inevitably to a global, rather than
individual, procedural approach.
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II. RECENT SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON PUNITIVE
DAMAGES AND CLASS ACTIONS
Over the last twenty years of Supreme Court jurisprudence,
there have been nine influential decisions devoted to punitive
damages and two similarly influential cases related to class actions.
The interests of the Supreme Court in both areas have been driven
by a major effort on the part of defendants to limit both the scope
of liability for compensatory awards and the circumstances and
amounts available for punitive damages awards. 2 At the same time,
there have been significant efforts in the state and federal judicial
and legislative arenas to accomplish similar goals by tightening the
prerequisites for an award of punitive damages and limiting the
amount that could be awarded, as well as channeling class actions
into federal court.
The outcome of these substantive law cases has been a critical
examination of almost every aspect of a punitive damages claim
and judicial restrictions on the flexibility of juries and lower courts
to sustain punitive damages awards. 3 The most recent cases, for
example, have demonstrated a linear, numeric ratio between
compensatory and punitive damages that is in accord with
constitutional standards. 4 Although most legal research has
2. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 414–15
(2003) (plaintiff arguing that an “‘honest mistake’ . . . did not warrant punitive
damages”). See also Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2619 (2008)
(“Exxon raises an issue of first impression about punitive damages in maritime
law, which falls within a federal court’s jurisdiction to decide in the manner of a
common law court, subject to the authority of Congress to legislate otherwise if
it disagrees with the judicial result.”); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559, 564–65 (1996) (BMW argued that its “good-faith belief made a punitive
award inappropriate,” that “its nondisclosure policy was consistent with the laws
of roughly 25 States defining the disclosure obligations of automobile
manufacturers, distributors, and dealers,” and that “its nondisclosure policy had
never been adjudged unlawful before this action was filed”); TXO Prod. Corp.
v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 451 (1993) (“TXO argued that the punitive
damages award violated the Due Process Clause,” and that “vagueness, lack of
guideline and the lack of any requirement of a reasonable relationship between
the actual injury and the punitive damage award, in essence, would cause the
Court or should cause the Court to set it aside on Constitutional grounds”).
3. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2623 (“Despite these limitations, punitive
damages overall are higher and more frequent in the United States than they are
anywhere else.”).
4. Compare Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1991)
(stating that although “more than 4 times the amount of compensatory damages”
might be “close to the line,” it did not “cross the line into the area of
constitutional impropriety”), and Gore, 517 U.S. at 582 (“[W]e have
consistently rejected the notion that the constitutional line is marked by a simple
mathematical formula, even one that compares actual and potential damages to
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revealed that punitive damages are awarded relatively infrequently
and amounts are often reduced by appellate courts, the “shadow
effect” of punitive damages has had a major effect on settlement
values: defendants tend to settle compensatory damages at a higher
level in order to avoid the risk of large punitive damages being
awarded at a jury trial. 5
Defendants have generally reacted quite negatively and
independently to the use of class actions, particularly in personal
injury cases, where large numbers of plaintiffs can be aggregated
into one case for trial. 6 The attitude of defendants toward the use
of class actions to settle cases is more nuanced, however.
Threatened by large numbers of individual claims, some
defendants prefer to obtain the global peace that might be afforded
by a class action. 7 However, the Supreme Court has been
extremely skeptical of class actions in personal injury cases. In
both Amchem Products v. Windsor (Amchem) 8 and Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 9 the Court rejected class action settlements

the punitive award.”), with Campbell, 538 U.S. at 429 (stating that “[i]n the
context of this case . . . there is a presumption against an award that has a 145to-1 ratio”).
5. See generally MARK PETERSON, SYAM SARMA, & MICHAEL SHANLEY,
INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS (1987).
6. See Francis E. McGovern, The Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions
in Mass Torts, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 595, 600 (1997) [hereinafter McGovern,
Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions] (“Plaintiffs’ counsel did not want to
lose control of their cases or have their fees set by judges; defendants felt that a
divide and conquer strategy was preferable to any form of aggregation where a
defendant might be forced into a bet-your-company trial.”). See also
Tetracycline Cases, 107 F.R.D. 719 (W.D. Mo. 1985). See generally In re Fed.
Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982).
7. McGovern, Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions, supra note 6, at
601 (stating that “in the late 1980’s, defense counsel began to see the potential
for closing the floodgates of mass tort litigation by the use of settlement
classes”). See generally Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 F.R.D 141 (S.D. Ohio
1992).
8. See 521 U.S. 591, 628–29 (1997) (“The argument is sensibly made that
a nationwide administrative claims processing regime would provide the most
secure, fair, and efficient means of compensating victims of asbestos exposure.
Congress, however, has not adopted such a solution. And Rule 23, which must
be interpreted with fidelity to the Rules Enabling Act and applied with the
interests of absent class members in close view, cannot carry the large load
CCR, class counsel, and the District Court heaped upon it.”).
9. See 527 U.S. 815, 864 (1999) (stating that “limited fund rationale could
under some circumstances be applied to a settlement class of tort claimants, it
would be essential that the fund be shown to be limited independently of the
agreement of the parties to the action, and equally essential under Rule 23(a) and
(b)(1)(B) that the class include all those with claims unsatisfied at the time of the
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under Rules 23 (b)(3) and 23(b)(1)(B) with rationales that leave
limited room for a successful certification of a class in future mass
tort litigation.
The Supreme Court cases that have reviewed punitive damages
and class actions together—State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Campbell 10 and Philip Morris USA v.
Williams 11 —have been similarly limiting. The future opportunities
for a class certification of punitive damages causes of action are
narrow, indeed.
III. DISAGGREGATING THE JURISPRUDENCE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
AND CLASS ACTIONS
Probably the most productive approach for discerning any
possibility for the certification of a class action for punitive
damages is to disaggregate the Supreme Court jurisprudence and
examine each key variable of that jurisprudence separately. Then it
might be possible to determine which aspect of each variable could
still lead to a possible scenario for a successful certification of a
punitive damages class. 12
A. Causes of Action
There has been substantial discussion of the similarity, or lack
thereof, among the elements of the theories of liability among

settlement negotiations, with intraclass conflicts addressed by recognizing
independently represented subclasses”). Of note, in both Amchem and Ortiz, the
lead opponents are plaintiff attorneys.
10. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 427 (2003)
(stating that “[i]n the context of this case . . . there is a presumption against an
award that has a 145-to-1 ratio”).
11. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 354 (2007) (stating
that “to permit punishment for injuring a nonparty victim would add a near
standardless dimension to the punitive damages equation”).
12. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 457 (1993)
(stating that punitive damages “awards are the product of numerous, and
sometimes intangible, factors; a jury imposing a punitive damages awards must
make a qualitative assessment based on a host of facts and circumstances unique
to the particular case before it”). See also Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S.
Ct. 2631, 2631 (2008) (“Although the legal landscape is well populated with
examples of ratios and multipliers expressing policies of retribution and
deterrence, most of them suffer from features that stand in the way of borrowing
them as paradigms of reasonable limitations suited for application to this case.”);
Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425 (“The precise award in any case, of course, must be
based upon the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s conduct and the harm
to the plaintiff.”).
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potential plaintiffs, particularly with differences in causation and
defenses. There also seems to be a focus on the level of fungibility
of damages incurred by plaintiffs with personal injuries as being
more individually unique, 13 financial loss as being more similar,14
and property and other damages as being somewhere in between. 15
B. Relationships
Attention has also been given to the relationship between and
among various elements of a putative case: 16 the relationship
between the act and the harm, 17 the replicability or hypothetical
nature of the conduct,18 and the relationship among the potential
class members. 19 There is an underlying Seventh Amendment
13. See Williams, 549 U.S. at 349; see also Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
945 So. 2d 1246, 1261 (Fla. 2006)
14. See generally BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). See
also Campbell, 538 U.S. at 426 (stating that “[t]he harm arose from a transaction
in the economic realm, not from some physical assault or trauma; there were no
physical injuries”); TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 447; Browning-Ferris Indus.
of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
15. See generally Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424
(2001).
16. See Williams, 549 U.S. at 353 (stating that “the Constitution’s Due
Process Clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages award to punish a
defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties or those whom they directly
represent, i.e., injury that it inflicts upon those who are, essentially, strangers to
the litigation”).
17. See Williams, 549 U.S. at 349–50 (“A jury found that Williams’ death
was caused by smoking; that Williams smoked in significant part because he
thought it was safe to do so; and that Philip Morris knowingly and falsely led
him to believe that this was so.”); Campbell, 538 U.S. at 423 (stating that “[a]
defendant should be punished for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff, not for
being an unsavory individual or business”); Gore, 517 U.S. at 585 (stating that
the court assumed “that the undisclosed damage to the new BMW’s affected
their actual value”); TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 460 (stating that “there is a
reasonable relationship between the punitive damages award and the harm likely
to result from the defendant’s conduct as well as the harm that actually has
occurred”).
18. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 582 (“[W]e have consistently rejected the notion
that the constitutional line is marked by a simple mathematical formula, even
one that compares actual and potential damages to the punitive award.”); see
also TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 460 (stating that “there is a reasonable
relationship between the punitive damages award and the harm likely to result
from the defendant’s conduct as well as the harm that actually has occurred”
(quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21 (1994)).
19. See Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997) (“Rule 23(a)
states four threshold requirements applicable to all class actions: (1) numerosity
(a ‘class [so large] that joinder of all members is impracticable’); (2)
commonality (‘questions of law or fact common to the class’); (3) typicality
(named parties’ claims or defenses ‘are typical . . . of the class’); and (4)
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concern that the individual right to a jury trial is maintained and
that rights are not violated simply because of a mere “relationship”
to others. 20
C. Goals
The focus of the Supreme Court cases has been almost
completely on overdeterrence, 21 with virtually no discussion of
underdeterrence. This instrumental analysis has been extremely
forceful in the arguments made by defendants. Because of the
procedural posture of these cases, there has been no substantial
occasion or incentive for a plaintiff to focus on the overall efforts
of coping with overdeterrence at the expense of underdeterrence. A
second goal has been ending the possibility of multiple punitive
damages awards against a single defendant arising out of an
incident with many potential plaintiffs. 22 If a defendant moves for
adequacy of representation (representatives ‘will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class’).”).
20. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Robert J. Nelson, Class Action Treatment of
Punitive Damages Issues after Phillip Morris v. Williams: We Can Get There
from Here, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV., 407, 429–30 n.66 (2008) (stating that “[w]e
recognize the concerns expressed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 750–51 (5th Cir. 1996), in
which that court held that bifurcation of issues in a nationwide smoking class
action violated the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.
However, subsequent to its decision in Castano, the Fifth Circuit held that the
risk of infringing on the parties’ Seventh Amendment rights is not significant
and is in fact avoided where the liability issues common to all class members are
tried together by a single initial jury, and issues affecting individual class
members such as causation, damages, and comparative negligence are tried by
different juries”).
21. See, e.g., Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142 (2007). See also
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2621 (2008) (stating that “the
consensus today is that punitives are aimed not at compensation but principally at
retribution and deterring harmful conduct”); Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419 (stating
“punitive damages should only be awarded if the defendant’s culpability, after
having paid compensatory damages, is so reprehensible as to warrant the
imposition of further sanctions to achieve punishment or deterrence”); BrowningFerris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 275 (1989) (“[P]unitive
damages advance the interests of punishment and deterrence, which are also
among the interests advanced by the criminal law . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 908 cmt. a (1977) (purposes of punitive damages are “the same” as
“that of a fine imposed after a conviction of a crime”).
22. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 840 (2d Cir.
1967) (“Although multiple punitive awards running into the hundreds may not
add up to a denial of due process, nevertheless if we were sitting as the highest
court of New York we would wish to consider very seriously whether awarding
punitive damages with respect to the negligent––even highly negligent––
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certification of a class to cabin all future punitive damages awards,
there is a greater chance for success than if plaintiffs make the
same motion.
D. Damages
Aside from the nature of the damages, there has been great
attention paid to whether compensatory damages were determined
prior to an award of punitive damages, 23 the ratio between
compensatory and punitive damages, 24 and a comparison of
comparable civil penalties and punitive damages. 25 The single digit
manufacture and sale of a drug governed by federal food and drug requirements,
especially in the light of the strengthening of these by the 1962 amendments, 76
Stat. 780 (1962), and the present vigorous attitude toward enforcement, would
not do more harm than good.”).
23. See, e.g., Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1262 (Fla.
2006) (“Engle Class’[] punitive damages claim, we must vacate the classwide
punitive damages award because we unanimously agree with the Third District
that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to determine a lump sum amount
before it determined the amount of total compensatory damages for the class. As
a matter of law, the punitive damages award violates due process because there
is no way to evaluate the reasonableness of the punitive damages award without
the amount of compensatory damages having been fixed. The amount awarded
is also clearly excessive because it would bankrupt some of the defendants.”).
24. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996) (“[W]e
have consistently rejected the notion that the constitutional line is marked by a
simple mathematical formula, even one that compares actual and potential
damages to the punitive award.”). See also Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2633
(“Accordingly, given the need to protect against the possibility (and the
disruptive cost to the legal system) of awards that are unpredictable and
unnecessary, either for deterrence or for measured retribution, we consider that a
1:1 ratio, which is above the median award, is a fair upper limit in such maritime
cases.”); Campbell, 538 U.S. at 428–29 (stating that “when used to determine
the dollar amount of the award, however, the criminal penalty has less utility.
Great care must be taken to avoid use of the civil process to assess criminal
penalties that can be imposed only after the heightened protections of a criminal
trial have been observed, including, of course, its higher standards of proof” and
that “[i]n the context of this case . . . there is a presumption against an award that
has a 145-to-1 ratio”); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443,
462 (1993) (stating that “trickery and deceit” may be more reprehensible than
negligence); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1991) (stating
that although “more than 4 times the amount of compensatory damages” might
be “close to the line,” it did not “cross the line into the area of constitutional
impropriety”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 21, § 908 cmt. c
(“Thus an award of nominal damages . . . is enough to support a further award of
punitive damages, when a tort, . . . is committed for an outrageous purpose, but
no significant harm has resulted.”).
25. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2634; Gore, 517 U.S. at 583 (“Comparing the
punitive damages award and the civil or criminal penalties that could be

442

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

ratio between compensatory and punitive damages has been the
“holy grail” for defendants seeking caps on punitive damages
awards, with its focus on the individual and the individual’s right
to receive compensation. 26
E. Scope
The scope of any punitive damages award—state or national; 27
individual or group; 28 party or non-party 29 —has also been the

imposed for comparable misconduct provides a third indicium of
excessiveness.”); TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 456 (“TXO . . . argues that
punitive damages awards should be scrutinized more strictly than legislative
penalties because they are typically assessed without any legislative guidance
expressing the considered judgment of the elected representatives of the
community.”); Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23 (“We are aware that the punitive damages
award in this case is more than 4 times the amount of compensatory damages, is
more than 200 times the out-of-pocket expenses of respondent . . . and, of
course, is much in excess of the fine that could be imposed for insurance fraud
under Ala. Code §§ 13A-5-11 and 13A-5-12(a) (1982), and Ala. Code §§ 27-112, 27-12-17, and 27-12-23 (1986).”); Browning-Ferris Indus., 492 U.S. at 301
(stating that “the reviewing court must accord ‘substantial deference’ to
legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue”
and that “because punitive damages are penal in nature, the court should
compare the civil and criminal penalties imposed in the same jurisdiction for
different types of conduct, and the civil and criminal penalties imposed by
different jurisdictions for the same or similar conduct”).
26. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2613 (“In the aftermath of the disaster, Exxon
spent around $2.1 billion in cleanup efforts. The United States charged the
company with criminal violations of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a)
and 1319(c)(1); the Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 407 and 411; the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703 and 707(a); the Ports and
Waterways Safety Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(1); and the Dangerous Cargo Act,
46 U.S.C. § 3718(b). Exxon pleaded guilty to violations of the Clean Water Act,
the Refuse Act, and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and agreed to pay a $150
million fine, later reduced to $25 million plus restitution of $100 million. A civil
action by the United States and the State of Alaska for environmental harms
ended with a consent decree for Exxon to pay at least $900 million toward
restoring natural resources, and it paid another $303 million in voluntary
settlements with fishermen, property owners, and other private parties.”);
Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425 (“The Court further referenced a long legislative
history, dating back over 700 years and going forward to today, providing for
sanctions of double, treble, or quadruple damages to deter and punish.”).
27. See generally Exxon, 128 S. Ct. 2605. See also Campbell, 538 U.S. at
421 (stating that a state does not “have a legitimate concern in imposing punitive
damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed outside of the
State[]”).
28. See generally Campbell, 538 U.S. 408. See also Philip Morris USA v.
Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
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subject of much discussion. Because state common law generally
controls tort damages and because of limits in various state
jurisdictions, it can be important that any award of punitive
damages is limited in its scope. Any application of one state’s laws
on punitive damages or class actions to another state’s citizens can
be problematic. The same argument applies to damages for an
individual as opposed to a group and to parties as opposed to nonparties. 30 The classic view of individualistic determinations of
liability and damages is difficult to translate into a larger setting;
applying the unique facts of a single party to a group or to nonparties is usually incompatible with a vision of individual rather
than group justice. 31
F. Nature of Conduct
Another critical variable in determining the appropriateness of
punitive damages in Supreme Court jurisprudence is the nature and
reprehensibility of the conduct: 32 whether or not the harm is
physical or economic, 33 whether there is financial vulnerability on
the part of the plaintiffs, 34 and whether or not the conduct involves

29. See Williams, 549 U.S. at 354 (stating that “to permit punishment for
injuring a nonparty victim would add a near standardless dimension to the
punitive damages equation. How many such victims are there? How seriously
were they injured? Under what circumstances did injury occur? The trial will not
likely answer such questions as to nonparty victims”).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 424 (“The reprehensibility guidepost does
not permit courts to expand the scope of the case so that a defendant may be
punished for any malfeasance, which in this case extended for a 20-year
period.”).
33. See id. at 425–26 (stating that “because there are no rigid benchmarks
that a punitive damages award may not surpass, ratios greater than those we
have previously upheld may comport with due process where ‘a particularly
egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages’” and
that “the harm arose from a transaction in the economic realm, not from some
physical assault or trauma; there were no physical injuries; and State Farm paid
the excess verdict before the complaint was filed, so the Campbells’ suffered
only minor economic injuries for the 18-month period in which State Farm
refused to resolve the claim against them”). See also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996) (stating that a high ratio may be required when
“the injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of noneconomic harm might
have been difficult to determine”); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292–93 (1983)
(“For example, as the criminal laws make clear, nonviolent crimes are less
serious than crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence.”).
34. Compare Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2625 (2008)
(“And a study of ‘financial injury’ cases using a different data set found that
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an isolated incident or systematic activity. 35 In addition, the extent
to which the conduct is intentional, 36 accidental, 37 or involves
reckless disregard 38 for the well-being of others can implicate the
level of reprehensibility.
G. Type of Class Action
The types of class actions, both state and federal—for example,
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1), 39 23(b)(2), 40 and
23(b)(3) 41 —constitute an important factor in analyzing whether or
not punitive damages are appropriate. Of course, the Rule 23(a)
34% of the punitive awards were greater than three times the corresponding
compensatory damages.”), with TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509
U.S. 443, 464 (1993) (“We note, however, that in Haslip we referred to the
‘financial position’ of the defendant as one factor that could be taken into
account in assessing punitive damages.”).
35. Compare Gore, 517 U.S. at 581, and Campbell, 538 U.S. at 429 (stating
that “[t]he Campbells’ have identified scant evidence of repeated misconduct of
the sort that injured them”), and Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346,
349, and Ciraolo v. City of N.Y., 216 F.3d 236, 248 (2d Cir. 2000), with Exxon,
128 S. Ct. at 2634.
36. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 429; Gore, 517 U.S. at 581; Browning-Ferris
Indus., 492 U.S. at 259; Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 248.
37. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2612 (“On the night of the spill it was carrying
53 million gallons of crude oil, or over a million barrels. Its captain was one
Joseph Hazelwood, who had completed a 28-day alcohol treatment program
while employed by Exxon, as his superiors knew, but dropped out of a
prescribed follow-up program and stopped going to Alcoholics Anonymous
meetings.”).
38. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2621 (“Reckless conduct is not intentional or
malicious, nor is it necessarily callous toward the risk of harming others, as
opposed to unheedful of it.”). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
supra note 21, § 500 cmt. a (“Recklessness may consist of either of two different
types of conduct. In one the actor knows, or has reason to know . . . of facts
which create a high degree of risk of . . . harm to another, and deliberately
proceeds to act, or to fail to act, in conscious disregard of, or indifference to, that
risk. In the other the actor has such knowledge, or reason to know, of the facts,
but does not realize or appreciate the high degree of risk involved, although a
reasonable man in his position would do so.”).
39. See Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997) (“Rule
23(b)(1) covers cases in which separate actions by or against individual class
members would risk establishing ‘incompatible standards of conduct for the
party opposing the class . . . .”).
40. See id. (“Rule 23(b)(2) permits class actions for declaratory or
injunctive relief where ‘the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act
on grounds generally applicable to the class.’ Civil rights cases against parties
charged with unlawful, class-based discrimination are prime examples.”).
41. See id. at 615 (“Rule 23(b)(3) permits certification where class suit
‘may nevertheless be convenient and desirable.’”).
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prerequisites must be met as well. 42 The post-Class Action
Fairness Act (CAFA) sensibilities can also have some effect on the
attitudes of courts toward class actions. 43
IV. POSSIBLE REAGGREGATION SCENARIOS FOR A PUNITIVE
DAMAGES CLASS ACTION
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker (Exxon) provides at least one
scenario in which there can be a punitive damages class action.44
In that case the cause of action was the same for all plaintiffs
arising from a single catastrophe; the relationship among the
plaintiffs was similar and real; the goal was to prevent
overdeterrence; the movant was the defendant; the compensatory
damages were for non-personal injuries—financial and property
damage—and had been determined; the scope was within a single
state and all parties were included; the conduct was determined to
be reprehensible; and the class action was under Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
in federal court. 45
Looking to the future, there may be circumstances similar to
Exxon that will occur. Other scenarios that would meet appellate
scrutiny for the certification of a punitive damages class action
could deviate from the Exxon model, but probably not too far. The
most likely deviations could involve a consumer fraud fact
situation in a single jurisdiction with all of the parties joined,
compensatory financial damages determined, and reprehensible
conduct. There could also be another catastrophe or disaster that
would contain enough similar variables to Exxon to warrant a
punitive damages class. 46
42. See id. at 613 (“Rule 23(a) states four threshold requirements applicable
to all class actions: (1) numerosity (a ‘class [so large] that joinder of all
members is impracticable’); (2) commonality (‘questions of law or fact common
to the class’); (3) typicality (named parties’ claims or defenses ‘are typical . . . of
the class’); and (4) adequacy of representation (representatives ‘will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class’).”).
43. See generally United States Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–1715 (2006).
44. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2613 (2008) (“The
District Court for the District of Alaska divided the plaintiffs seeking
compensatory damages into three classes: commercial fishermen, Native
Alaskans, and landowners. At Exxon’s behest, the court also certified a mandatory
class of all plaintiffs seeking punitive damages, whose number topped 32,000.”).
The plaintiffs opposed class certification for punitive damages; however, the
Supreme Court did not review the class certification issue.
45. See generally id.
46. Id. at 2611 (“On March 24, 1989, the supertanker Exxon grounded on
Bligh Reef off the Alaskan coast, fracturing its hull and spilling millions of
gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound. . . . On the night of the spill it
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Needless to say, these potential scenarios are extremely
limited. How far a court could go beyond the currently approved
model is problematic. Another uncertainty is the motivation of
plaintiffs’ counsel ever to attempt to satisfy these restrictive
requirements contained in Supreme Court jurisprudence. It is far
more likely that the plaintiffs would attempt to maximize their
compensatory damages claims rather than swing for the fences in a
much riskier endeavor. “Experience” seems to dominate “hope,”
particularly since the Supreme Court did not address the class
certification issue in Exxon.
V. PROPENSITY FOR A GLOBAL VIEW OF SIMILARLY SITUATED CASES
There has been, however, a persistent tendency on the part of
trial judges when confronted by large numbers of similarly situated
cases to attempt to resolve them globally.47 This has been the case
particularly when litigation presents the possibility of multiple
punitive damages awards. Trial judges have sought, and will
continue to seek, procedures for the aggregation of claims in order
to preempt the need for separate trial after separate trial of cases
that seem to them quite similar. 48 There are also occasions where a

was carrying 53 million gallons of crude oil, or over a million barrels. Its captain
was one Joseph Hazelwood, who had completed a 28-day alcohol treatment
program while employed by Exxon, as his superiors knew, but dropped out of a
prescribed follow-up program and stopped going to Alcoholics Anonymous
meetings.”).
47. See Francis E. McGovern, Judicial Centralization and Devolution in
Mass Torts, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2077, 2082 (1997) (citing JACK B. WEINSTEIN,
INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS
ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATION, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 131–32 (1995))
(stating that mass tort management should consist of “(1) the concentration of
decision making in one or a few judges; (2) a single forum responsible for
resolving legal and factual issues; (3) a single substantive law; (4) adequate
judicial support facilities; (5) reasonable fact-finding procedures, particularly as
to scientific issues; (6) a cap on the total cost to defendants such as by limiting
punitive damages and allocations for pain and suffering and a method of
allocating that cost among multiple defendants; (7) a single distribution plan
with fairly inflexible scheduled payments by injury based on the need of those
injured, rather than the social and economic status of plaintiffs, and tailored to
the availability of private resources”).
48. See Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 474 (5th Cir. 1986)
(“Should the jury be allowed to award in the aggregate any punitive damages it
finds appropriate, it must be instructed to factor in the possibility that none of
the unnamed plaintiffs may have suffered any damages. Alternatively, the jury
could be allowed to award an amount of money that each class member should
receive for each dollar of actual damages awarded.”).
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judge will see a circumstance where punitive damages are
warranted but have never been awarded. 49
In the drug context there was Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrill,
in which Judge Friendly bewailed the risks of multiple punitive
damages awards. 50 With medical devices, there was the Dalkon
Shield litigation, in which Judge Williams tried to use the class
action device to have one trial for punitive damages against the
A.H. Robins Company. 51 In the asbestos litigation, Judges
Parker, 52 Sarokin, 53 and Weiner 54 all attempted to use class actions
to resolve large numbers of separate lawsuits with one procedural

49. See In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86, 106 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“The
class action now certified provides a reasonable and conservative solution
consonant with legal and equitable tradition” and “provides an opportunity to
effectively address problems of punitive damages in mass torts. The Tobacco
litigation is a particularly useful vehicle because it addresses a mature tort with
many cases already tried, providing some benchmarks for both compensatory
and punitive damages. An immature mass litigation, where an early punitive
damage class is assembled without any testing of what juries will do, does not
permit the mega-analysis appropriate in this mature dispute approaching its
closing stages.”).
50. See 378 F.2d 832, 840 (2d Cir. 1967) (“Although multiple punitive
awards running into the hundreds may not add up to a denial of due process,
nevertheless if we were sitting as the highest court of New York we would wish
to consider very seriously whether awarding punitive damages with respect to
the negligent––even highly negligent––manufacture and sale of a drug governed
by federal food and drug requirements, especially in the light of the
strengthening of these by the 1962 amendments, 76 Stat. 780 (1962), and the
present vigorous attitude toward enforcement, would not do more harm than
good.”).
51. See In re N. Dist. of Cal. “Dalkon Shield” IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 521
F. Supp. 1188, 1190 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
52. See generally Jenkins, 782 F.2d 468. See also Cimino v. Raymark
Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990).
53. See Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053, 1056 (D.N.J.
1989) (arguing that “[a]nother suggestion for blunting the potential of multiple
punitive damage awards is a preemptive class action by the manufacturer to
establish a single punitive damage award binding upon all present or potential
claimants.” Yet “[i]f the existence of this alternative serves to deny defendants
so situated the right to claim that successive punitive damage awards for the
same wrongful conduct are unconstitutional, then manufacturers would be
placed in an unenviable dilemma as soon as a second suit was instituted.”
Further, “even if a defendant were inclined to adopt this suicidal course, there is
some doubt whether it would be successful”).
54. See Order, In re Asbestos Bankr. Litig., 1992 WL 423943 (J.P.M.L.
Dec. 9, 1992) (No. 950) (Judge Weiner argued for and eventually succeeded in
consolidating 26,639 asbestos claims and conducting multi-district litigation
before his court).
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device. 55 In the tobacco litigation, Judge Weinstein and the Florida
judiciary sought to bring finality to punitive damages claims. 56
With the exceptions of Exxon 57 and the older Agent Orange 58
case, there has been little judicial success in these aggregation
efforts, regardless of whether it has been to avoid multiple punitive
damages awards, eliminate the need for multiple trials, or assess
additional damages. A reading of these appellate opinions suggests
that differences in opinion on this subject are driven less by liberal
or conservative ideology and more by judges who favor a
pragmatic, if imperfect, resolution of cases, as opposed to judges
who view the individual’s right to an individual trial as a matter of
principle that cannot be violated.

55. See Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628–29 (1997) (“The
argument is sensibly made that a nationwide administrative claims processing
regime would provide the most secure, fair, and efficient means of
compensating victims of asbestos exposure. Congress, however, has not adopted
such a solution. And Rule 23, which must be interpreted with fidelity to the
Rules Enabling Act and applied with the interests of absent class members in
close view, cannot carry the large load CCR, class counsel, and the District
Court heaped upon it.”). See also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864
(1999) (stating that “limited fund rationale could under some circumstances be
applied to a settlement class of tort claimants, it would be essential that the fund
be shown to be limited independently of the agreement of the parties to the
action, and equally essential under Rule 23(a) and (b)(1)(B) that the class
include all those with claims unsatisfied at the time of the settlement
negotiations, with intraclass conflicts addressed by recognizing independently
represented subclasses”).
56. See generally In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). See
also Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006).
57. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2613 (2008) (“The
District Court for the District of Alaska divided the plaintiffs seeking
compensatory damages into three classes: commercial fishermen, Native
Alaskans, and landowners. At Exxon’s behest, the court also certified a mandatory
class of all plaintiffs seeking punitive damages, whose number topped 32,000.”).
58. See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 723
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (“Unlike the asbestos, DES, Dalkon Shield, and Federal
Skywalk cases, defendants contest liability not just as to individual members of
the class, but as to any members of the class. Thus, unlike other mass product
liability cases, a determination of general causation will serve both the interests
of judicial economy and assist in the speedy and less expensive resolution of
individual class member’s claims.”).
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The Amchem 59 and Ortiz 60 cases illustrate this point rather
well. The opponents of class action treatment of the asbestos
personal injury cases were drawn from both the left and right of the
political spectrum, and they joined in promoting a more
deontological approach with the fundamental principle that
personal injury lawsuits were, indeed, personal and that the
individual aspects of lawsuits were not fungible. 61 This view holds
that it is impossible to take a global view of the inherent
differences in each plaintiff’s own circumstances and still satisfy
due process in the context of the Seventh Amendment. 62
The pragmatists tend to represent a more centrist political view
that “the perfect is the enemy of the good” and that the lack of
ideal individualization for each case is more than outweighed by a
faster and more homogenized aggregated process. They favor
consolidation of similarly situated mass tort cases in order to
promote access to some justice rather than perfect justice. 63 They
59. Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 628–29 (“The argument is sensibly made
that a nationwide administrative claims processing regime would provide the
most secure, fair, and efficient means of compensating victims of asbestos
exposure. Congress, however, has not adopted such a solution. And Rule 23,
which must be interpreted with fidelity to the Rules Enabling Act and applied
with the interests of absent class members in close view, cannot carry the large
load CCR, class counsel, and the District Court heaped upon it.”).
60. Oritz, 527 U.S. at 864 (stating that “limited fund rationale could under
some circumstances be applied to a settlement class of tort claimants, it would
be essential that the fund be shown to be limited independently of the agreement
of the parties to the action, and equally essential under Rule 23(a) and (b)(1)(B)
that the class include all those with claims unsatisfied at the time of the
settlement negotiations, with intraclass conflicts addressed by recognizing
independently represented subclasses”).
61. Compare Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. 591, and Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 864,
with BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996) (stating that a
high ratio may be required when “the injury is hard to detect or the monetary
value of noneconomic harm might have been difficult to determine”), and Solem
v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292–93 (1983) (“For example, as the criminal laws make
clear, nonviolent crimes are less serious than crimes marked by violence or the
threat of violence.”).
62. See Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 437 (2001)
(“Because the jury’s award of punitive damages does not constitute a finding of
‘fact,’ appellate review of the district court’s determination that an award is
consistent with due process does not implicate the Seventh Amendment
concerns raised by respondent and its amicus.”).
63. See McGovern, Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions, supra note 6,
at 607 (stating that “[i]n the mature mass torts, so the pragmatist argument goes,
the bulk of the cases are currently handled by counsel in the aggregate anyway
without the trappings of individual rights characterized by an idealistic view of
due process, so why not recognize this reality and use procedures such as class
actions that at least would have the benefit of some judicial scrutiny?”
McGovern also states that “[e]ven if there were agreement with this view of
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look more to the practicality available in bankruptcy procedure and
to the instrumentalism associated with the mass resolution of
claims via the class action.
The principle versus pragmatism debate will not end with
Exxon. In that case, both the plaintiffs and the defendants
supported a single resolution of punitive damages, and they joined
issue to contest the appropriate amount of those punitive
damages. 64 The less a cause of action seems unique, the more
powerful the pragmatic arguments. The more unique the claim—be
it because of scope, conduct, damages, or relationships—the more
persuasive the arguments based upon principle. 65 The strong
impetus provided by a trial judge’s desire to approach the claim in
the interest of judicial economy will probably lead to future
opportunities to test the limits of the position based upon principle.
VI. ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR “PUNITIVE DAMAGES”
The current punitive damages jurisprudence focuses on
punishment, retribution, and overdeterrence. 66 There is another
rationale that, if adopted by the Supreme Court, would open a new
avenue for the use of class actions and “extra compensatory,”

reality, the more doctrinaire left and right would argue that this is a problem for
someone other than the federal judicial system: from the left, the legislature
should provide more judicial resources and from the right, provide a legislative
claims process; from the left, state courts do a great job and from the right, these
types of cases belong in state courts anyway.”).
64. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2613 (2008) (“The
District Court for the District of Alaska divided the plaintiffs seeking
compensatory damages into three classes: commercial fishermen, Native
Alaskans, and landowners. At Exxon's behest, the court also certified a
mandatory class of all plaintiffs seeking punitive damages, whose number
topped 32,000.”).
65. Compare id. at 2613, and State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell,
538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003), with Philips Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346,
354 (2007), and Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1261 (Fla. 2006).
66. See generally Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of
Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1982). See also Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23–24 (stating that although “more than 4 times the
amount of compensatory damages” might be “close to the line,” it did not “cross
the line into the area of constitutional impropriety”); Catherine M. Sharkey,
Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 351–52 (2003)
(stating that “punitive damages have been used to pursue not only the goals of
retribution and deterrence, but also to accomplish, however crudely, a societal
compensation goal: the redress of harms caused by defendants who injure
persons beyond the individual plaintiffs in a particular case”).
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“exemplary,” or “punitive” damages. 67 That argument has arisen
out of an economic analysis of deterrence in the law that suggests a
need for additional damages—whether they be called “public,”
“punitive,” “societal,” or “extra-remedial”—to be assessed against
a tortfeasor beyond the compensatory damages sought by
individual plaintiffs. 68 These damages are designed to ensure that
the tortfeasor internalizes all of the costs associated with its
tortious conduct, rather than only the costs associated with the
limited number of plaintiffs who file a lawsuit. 69
The argument from the perspective of an economic analysis of
deterrence and damages contends that underdeterrence is as much
of a problem in motivating appropriate conduct by parties as
overdeterrence. 70 The optimal investment in safety for a party
occurs when the marginal cost of an investment in safety equals
the marginal benefits of that investment. 71 The tort system
mandates liability—either through negligence or a strict liability
67. See Thomas B. Colby, Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v.
Williams: The Past, Present, and Future of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J.
392, 392 (2008) [hereinafter Colby, Clearing the Smoke] (stating prior to
Williams, the court “awarded punitive damages to punish the defendant for the
harm it caused to all of society, not just the harm that is visited upon the
individual plaintiff before the court”); Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple
Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private
Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583, 584 (2003) [hereinafter Colby, Multiple
Punishment Problem] (stating that “[t]he plaintiff’s attorney . . . will ask the jury
to impose punitive damages in an amount sufficient not only for harming the
plaintiff, but also for the full scope of harm that its conduct caused to all victims
and to all of society”); A. Mitchell Polinksy & Steven Shavell, Punitive
Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 874 (1998) (stating
that “the proper level of total damages to impose . . . is the harm caused
multiplied by the reciprocal of the probability of being found liable”). See
generally WILLIAMS M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
ACCIDENT LAW (1987).
68. See generally Colby, Multiple Punishment Problem, supra note 67, at
584 (stating that “[t]he plaintiff’s attorney . . . will ask the jury to impose
punitive damages in an amount sufficient not only for harming the plaintiff, but
also for the full scope of harm that its conduct caused to all victims and to all of
society”); Sharkey, supra note 66, at 351–52 (stating that “punitive damages
have been used to pursue not only the goals of retribution and deterrence, but
also to accomplish, however crudely, a societal compensation goal: the redress
of harms caused by defendants who injure persons beyond the individual
plaintiffs in a particular case”).
69. See supra note 67.
70. See id.
71. See Polinksy & Shavell, supra note 67, at 878 (“If damages are either
lower or higher than the harm, various socially undesirable consequences will
result.”). See generally Kenneth W. Simons, Deontology, Negligence, Tort, and
Crime, 76 B.U. L. REV. 273, 273 (1996).
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standard—if a party does not invest appropriately in safety; it
deters by placing liability costs on parties whose conduct results in
an under-investment in safety. 72 The overdeterrence rationale
focuses on the possibility that the tort system will force a party to
overinvest in safety because of the threat of tort liability. 73
Excessive punitive damages awards, or even the threat of excessive
punitive damages awards, might lead a party to exceed the optimal
level of safety in order to avoid liability. Any such overdeterrence
would create a suboptimal allocation of resources between the
marginal costs and benefits. 74 Likewise, if the tort system
underdeters parties from investing in safety, there will also be a
suboptimal allocation of resources. 75 In any given instance of
conduct by a defendant, this economic analysis suggests that there
should be no liability for negligence if the marginal cost of safety
equals its marginal benefit. 76 If the legal regime is strict liability,
the defendant will be liable for all losses caused but will still invest
the same optimal amount in safety because an appropriate
allocation of resources will occur when the marginal costs of safety
and benefit are equal. 77 Liability under a strict liability legal
doctrine will affect the distribution of resources between plaintiff
and defendant but not the allocation of those resources.
A problem of underdeterrence can arise in the context of mass
tortious activity, however, when the tort system does not
incorporate the harm imposed by a defendant. From the
perspective of society as a whole, if a defendant faces litigation
from only ten to twenty percent of the plaintiffs who are tortiously
harmed—a normal range of lawsuit filings—then that defendant
will underinvest in safety because it is not fully benefitting from
72. These concepts are covered in many torts casebooks. See, e.g., JAMES A.
HENDERSON, JR. & RICHARD N. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 38–42, 327–33
(3d ed. 1988) (discussing the debates concerning the proper goals of tort law and
the judiciary’s role in achieving these objectives). See also GUIDO CALABRESI,
THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 24–33 (1970);
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 206–11 (4th ed. 1992);
Symposium, Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 485 (1980). See
also AARON D. TWERSKY & JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR., TORTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS (2d ed. 2008); Jules Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful
Gain, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 421, 422–24 (1982).
73. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW,
AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2004).
74. Id.
75. See Polinksy & Shavell, supra note 67, at 878 (“If damages are either
lower or higher than the harm, various socially undesirable consequences will
result.”).
76. See generally TWERSKY & HENDERSON, supra note 72.
77. Id.
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the avoidance of liability resulting from an optimal investment in
safety. 78 If only twenty percent of injured plaintiffs sue, then the
defendants will be responsible for only twenty percent of the
damages and will, therefore, invest less in safety to correspond
with the lower benefit of the avoided accidents. Although the
defendant may thus invest rationally in safety from its own
perspective, there is a lower than optimal investment in safety from
the perspective of society reflected in the uncompensated harms of
the eighty percent of injured plaintiffs who did not sue. As a result,
from the perspective of society, there has been underdeterrence;
more accidents were caused because the defendant did not have to
pay for them—society at large paid for them. If a defendant is not
obligated to pay for all the harm it causes, it will underinvest in
safety. 79 The ramifications of the defendant’s underinvestment in
safety are an excess of harm caused to society. The tort system has
underdeterred defendants.
It is this potential underdeterrence that leads economists to
argue that additional damages should be imposed on defendants
who underinvest in safety because they anticipate that only a small
percentage of harmed parties will actually seek compensation by

78. See generally Francis E. McGovern, Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons,
88 VA. L. REV. 1721 (2002) [hereinafter McGovern, Tragedy]. See also
DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE
UNITED STATES 110 (1991); Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts
for Judges, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1821 (1995). For the other most frequently cited
studies of claiming rates, see ALFRED F. CONRAD ET AL., AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS: STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY
REPARATION 262–96 (1964) (outlining attitudes and opinions of plaintiffs and
potential plaintiffs toward filing lawsuits); PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 60 (1985) (noting that
medical malpractice claims peaked in 1975 at one claim for every eight
physicians); HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS AND
LAWYERS: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION AND PATIENT
COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK, 7-1 to 7-35 (1990) (analyzing the potential
plaintiffs that filed medical malpractice claims); Hazel Glenn, Who Claims
Compensation: Factors Associated with Claiming and Obtaining Damages, in
COMPENSATION AND SUPPORT FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY 45–65 (Donald Harris
et al. eds., 1984) (reporting the results of a study that showed only twelve
percent of injured individuals obtained compensation through the legal system);
Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims and Disputes: Assessing
the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 525, 544–45 (1981) (reporting
the results of an empirical study that showed that only three point eight percent
of people with tort grievances actually filed suit).
79. Sharkey, supra note 66, at 367 (stating that “the addition of punitive
damages in some amount above and beyond compensatory damages is
warranted” to combat underdeterrence “so that the wrongdoer internalizes all of
the costs of its actions, and is thus appropriately deterred from causing harm”).
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filing a lawsuit. 80 The type of damages that can be imposed on
defendants to raise their marginal benefit curve to the level of
society’s marginal benefit are often referred to as “public,”
“exemplary,” “extra compensatory,” or “punitive” damages. 81 This
type of damages does not, however, have a punishment or
retributive rationale. It is designed to counteract the normal
underdeterrence of the tort system because of a low propensity of
individuals to sue, and it has the instrumental goal of achieving
optimal investment in safety from the perspective of society in
general.
Unlike the conception of litigation as a one plaintiff–one
defendant endeavor, the economic perspective looks at the welfare
of society as a whole and is correspondingly much more in tune
with the more pragmatic jurisprudence of supporters of punitive
damages class actions. 82 A single award of damages to achieve an
optimal level of investment in safety for a defendant could be
achieved if all plaintiffs in a mass tort brought suit and were
compensated; there would be no need for an overall damages
assessment. The reality is, however, that underdeterrence is the
norm because parties simply do not avail themselves of the tort
system. The economic rationale argues that the only method of
achieving optimal deterrence is to make an assessment of all the
harm caused by tortious conduct.
VII. ASSESSING SOCIETAL HARM
A logical question is whether or not it is possible to define a
marginal benefit curve for society associated with any type of
tortious conduct. Measuring the volume of tort claims past and
future has been the subject of extensive analysis and research in a

80. See supra note 67.
81. See generally VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID F.
PARTLETT, TORTS: CASES & MATERIALS (10th ed. 2001). See also Colby,
Multiple Punishment Problem, supra note 67, at 584 (stating that “[t]he
plaintiff’s attorney . . . will ask the jury to impose punitive damages in an
amount sufficient not only for harming the plaintiff, but also for the for the full
scope of harm that its conduct caused to all victims and to all of society”);
Sharkey, supra note 66, at 351–52 (stating that “punitive damages have been
used to pursue not only the goals of retribution and deterrence, but also to
accomplish, however crudely, a societal compensation goal: the redress of harms
caused by defendants who injure persons beyond the individual plaintiffs in a
particular case”).
82. See Sharkey, supra note 66, at 365 (stating that “[t]he goal is to force
tortfeasors, and others similarly situated, to internalize the harms to society
caused by their conduct”).
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number of different cases. 83 The insurance industry has extensive
expertise in this type of analysis, and companies set up reserves for
potential liability on a regular basis. 84 In bankruptcy proceedings,
it is not unusual for a court to estimate the present and future value
of all tort claims pending against a defendant in accordance, for
example, with Section 502(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. 85
Variations on these themes include litigation settlement viability,
design, and support; insurance buyouts; litigation risk assessment
and planning; and operational planning and damage calculation.86
The quantitative literature and the experience in economic
prognostication suggest that it is feasible to assess both individual
and societal harm with significant predictive power. 87
At the individual case level, there are numerous analytic tools
to estimate the value of claims, from case matching, to grids, to
expert systems, to decision trees, to single algorithms to complex
algorithms. 88 It is possible to look to the history of trials and
settlements to compare the characteristics of a pending case with
similar characteristics of previously resolved cases in order to
83. See PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, LITIGATION RISK ASSESSMENT FOR
INSURANCE COUNSEL (1996).
84. Id.
85. Estimation of the Number and Value of Pending and Future AsbestosRelated Personal Injury Claims, In re W.R. Gace & Co., 366 B.R. 302 (Bankr.
D. Del. 2007) (No. 01-01139 (JFK)); Projected Liabilities for Asbestos Personal
Injury Claims as of April 2001, In re W.R. Grace & Co., 366 B.R. 302;
FREDERICK C. DUNBAR, DENISE NEUMANN MARTIN & PHOEBUS J. DHYMES,
ESTIMATING FUTURE CLAIMS: CASE STUDIES FROM MASS TORT AND PRODUCT
LIABILITY (2004). See also 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (2006).
86. See generally DUNBAR ET AL., supra note 85.
87. See generally DUNBAR ET AL., supra note 85; Francis E. McGovern,
Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659, 660 (1989)
[hereinafter McGovern, Resolving Mass Tort Litigation] (stating that “fairness––
values of predictability, rationality, and equality of opportunity and strategy” are
at issue in mass tort litigation).
88. See McGovern, Tragedy, supra note 78, at 1729–31. See generally
Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex
Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 440 (1986) [hereinafter McGovern, Managing
Complex Litigation]; Francis E. McGovern, Dispute Systems Design: The
United Nations Compensation Commission, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 171,
184–87 (2009) [hereinafter McGovern, UN Compensation]; Francis E.
McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1361, 1364 n.5 (2005) [hereinafter McGovern, Claims Resolution
Facilities] (“The United Nations Compensation Commission was established
after the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. Its role was to determine the amount
of money to be paid by Iraq to claimants from nearly 100 countries, based upon
eligibility criteria determined by the U.N. Security Counsel. The money was to
be paid from a twenty-five percent share of the proceeds from the oil-for-food
program operating under U.N. auspices.”).
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“match” the unknown value of the former with the known value of
the latter. 89 In circumstances where the value of cases is driven by
a small number of variables, there are grids that can define the
value of cases depending upon the differentiation in the
variables. 90 As was done in the silicone gel breast implant cases, a
typical grid might have age, disease, and disability as the three
major variables defining values. 91 An expert system is a more
complicated series of “if . . . then” statements organized from
interviews of experts familiar with the relative values of cases.
Experts can opine that if a person has the following combination of
characteristics related to symptoms, exposure, age, dependants,
income, health history, and an unlimited number of additional
factors, then the value of the case is “x.” Expert systems are also
used in a number of other contexts, including medical diagnosis. 92
Decision trees are commonly used in decision analyses to isolate a
number of independent variables to be resolved sequentially to
reach a conclusion. 93 Typically there are several alternative
decision paths determined, probabilities are placed on the
likelihood of each path, and the chances of any given outcome are
calculated mathematically. There are also algorithms that have
been constructed to provide relative weights to either small or large
numbers of variables that seem to combine to establish the value of
a case. 94 Most of the asbestos trusts have fairly complex
mathematical algorithms that can disaggregate the critical aspects
of an individual’s case and then reaggregate them in a formula that
reflects the overall value of the case. 95 Most mass tort settlements
89. See McGovern, UN Compensation, supra note 88, at 174 (comparing
the Iran–U.S. Claims Tribunal to the United Nations Compensation
Commission); McGovern, Managing Complex Litigation, supra note 88, at 440
(comparing United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich. 1979),
aff’d, 712 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1983) with the asbestos litigation).
90. See Dow Corning Settlement Facility Annex A, In re Dow Corning
Corp., 244 B.R. 705 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999).
91. See McGovern, Tragedy, supra note 78, at 1736; McGovern, UN
Compensation, supra note 88, at 184.
92. See generally PHILLIP C. GIARRATANO & GARY D. RILEY, EXPERT
SYSTEMS: PRINCIPLES & PROGRAMMING (4th ed. 2004).
93. See S.C. Res. 686, ¶ 2(b), U.N. Doc. S/RES 686 (Mar. 2, 1991);
McGovern, Tragedy, supra note 78, at 1736; McGovern, UN Compensation,
supra note 88, at 192.
94. See Asbestos Personal Injury Settlement Trust Distribution Procedures
at 6–15, In re W. Asbestos Co., 313 B.R. 832 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2003).
95. See Francis E. McGovern, The Evolution of Asbestos Bankruptcy Trust
Distribution Plans, 62 N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law 163, 173 (2006)
(“Probably the most dramatic evidence of a change in valuation criteria can be
seen by the variation in the relative amount of money paid to malignancy claims
as opposed to the lowest non-malignancy claims. Manville-Original can be used
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result in trusts designed to pay all present and future claims based
upon claim evaluation methodologies that are designed to create
horizontal and vertical equity for all claimants. 96
At the aggregate level, any number of methodologies are
currently used to evaluate the total value of all defined tort
claims. 97 These modeling and estimation methodologies typically
include a factual analysis of available data concerning the relevant
population, a series of assumptions about the effect of tortious
conduct on that population, and, finally, a sophisticated
mathematical analysis using regressions analysis, neural
computation, and Monte Carlo simulations. 98
VIII. MODELING METHODOLOGY
The methodology for modeling the total value of liabilities for
a defined tort has been intensely scrutinized in the crucible of
litigation. 99 This methodology can be applied both to cases that
have a defined universe of claims, the expectation of future claims,
or a combination of the two. 100
The initial step is to define and describe the target population.
In the Dalkon Shield case, for example, that definition was
obtained from marketing data on customers, such as age,
geographic region, duration, and initiation of use of the product. 101
In the asbestos cases, the sources of information were the
industries using asbestos and publicly available data on the size,
turnover, and composition of that workforce. 102
The next step is to define and characterize the adverse effects
of the tortious activity. For the Dalkon Shield case, public health

to illustrate the ratio of Mesothelioma to Other Asbestos Disease which was in
the range of 17:1; for Lung Cancer I 3:1; and for Severe Asbestosis 4:1.”).
96. See McGovern, Claims Resolution Facilities, supra note 88, at 138.
97. See generally supra note 67.
98. See Estimation of the Number and Value of Pending and Future
Asbestos-Related Personal Injury Claims, supra note 85; Projected Liabilities
for Asbestos Personal Injury Claims as of April 2001, supra note 85; DUNBAR
ET AL., supra note 85.
99. In re Fed.-Mogul Global Inc., 411 B.R. 148 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008).
100. See generally supra note 67.
101. See generally RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF
THE DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY (1993).
102. See Estimation of the Number and Value of Pending and Future
Asbestos-Related Personal Injury Claims, supra note 85; Asbestos Personal
Injury Claims as of April 2001, supra note 85; Supplemental Report for Mark A.
Peterson, In re Fed. Mogul Global, Inc., 411 B.R. 148 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008)
(No. 01-10578 (RTL)); DUNBAR ET AL., supra note 85.
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experts provided the incidence of pelvic inflammatory disease and
infertility. 103 For the asbestos cases, there were Occupational
Health and Safety Act (OSHA) epidemiological models for
asbestos-related diseases, including time, duration, and degree of
exposure to asbestos.104 There were also the various mortality rates
for the population at large. Then there was the relationship
between the incidence of adverse effects and the target
population. 105 This involved matching the incidence of harm to the
customers or exposed universe. Next was the task of characterizing
the causal link between use and effect. In the Dalkon Shield case,
there was no causal link assumed; the causal link was the subject
of proof. 106 In the asbestos cases, the OSHA causal analysis was
suggested. 107 It was then possible to estimate the potential
population with the adverse effect. The incidence rates were
applied to the customers or exposed population. 108
Under the normal use of this methodology, the next step is to
characterize the propensity to sue by looking at filings by state and
age group; settlement values by age, injury, and geography; and
dismissal rates. 109 Once that litigating population is estimated, it is
possible to apply trial rates of lawsuit behavior to the estimated
population with the adverse effect. This step illustrates why the
calculus of a defendant in estimating potential liability for tortious
conduct inevitably concludes that the cost of that conduct to the
defendant will be less than the cost to society as a whole.
The modeling methodology for estimating the total cost of
tortious conduct would eschew the need for analyzing the
“propensity to sue” variable and go directly to historical values of
the estimated population with the adverse effect. 110
IX. ESTIMATION METHODOLOGIES IN BANKRUPTCY
Section 502(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides for the judicial
estimation of all legal claims pending against a bankrupt entity 111 .
103. See In re N. Dist. of Cal. “Dalkon Shield” IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693
F.2d 847, 848–49 (9th Cir. 1982).
104. See DUNBAR ET AL., supra note 85.
105. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, ELEVATED RISK OF PELVIC
INFLAMMATORY DISEASE AMONG WOMEN USING THE DALKON SHIELD (1983).
106. See generally “Dalkon Shield” IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847.
107. See supra note 95.
108. See generally KENNETH J. ROTHMAN, SANDER GREENLAND & TIMOTHY
L. LASH, MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY (3rd ed. 2008).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 11 USC § 50(c) (2006).
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Three approaches have been utilized consistently with the modeling
methodology described above: generic, sampling, and de novo.
Under the generic approach, historical data is compiled
concerning the value of cases that have been previously
resolved. 112 Then data is prepared projecting the potential number
of claims that must be resolved, either from a defined or projected
universe of claims. Generally, the estimation is based upon a linear
calculation of past to future, adjusting for the passage of time. 113
With the sampling approach, a statistically significant sample
of both previously resolved cases and pending cases are related. 114
Each case is examined to determine its relevant characteristics so
that the two universes of cases can be compared statistically. The
values of the previously resolved cases are applied to the relevant
pending cases, and then that data is extrapolated to the universe of
cases as a whole. 115
The de novo approach ignores history and creates a new history
in the context of the estimation hearing. 116 Rather than rely on old
litigation system values, a new series of values are created for
representative cases, and those new values are then extrapolated to
the entire universe of claims. Where there are future claims that
must be estimated, various assumptions based upon the best
available statistical evidence are used for purposes of
extrapolation. 117

112. See Projected Liabilities for Asbestos Personal Injury Claims as of April
2001, supra note 85; Supplemental Report for Mark A. Peterson, supra note 102.
113. See Estimation of the Number and Value of Pending and Future
Asbestos-Related Personal Injury Claims, supra note 85; Projected Liabilities
for Asbestos Personal Injury Claims as of April 2001, supra note 85;
Supplemental Report for Mark A. Peterson, supra note 102; DUNBAR ET AL.,
supra note 85.
114. See McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, supra note 87,
at 660 (stating that “fairness––values of predictability, rationality, and equality
of opportunity and strategy” are at issue in mass tort litigation). See also Francis
E. McGovern, Distribution of Funds in Class Actions––Claims Administration,
35 J. CORP. L. 123 (2009) [hereinafter McGovern, Claims Administration]. See
generally Cabraser & Nelson, supra note 20.
115. See Estimation of the Number and Value of Pending and Future
Asbestos-Related Personal Injury Claims, supra note 85; Projected Liabilities
for Asbestos Personal Injury Claims as of April 2001, supra note 85;
Supplemental Report for Mark A. Peterson, supra note 102; DUNBAR ET AL.,
supra note 85.
116. Questionnaire, In re W.R. Grace & Co., 366 B.R. 302 (Bankr. D. Del.
2007) (No. 01-01139 (JFK)); Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of W.R. Grace & Co.’s Motion to Approve PI CMO and Questionnaire, In re
W.R. Grace & Co., 366 B.R. 302.
117. See generally SOBOL, supra note 101.
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X. ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES
Once there has been a determination of the appropriate level of
investment in safety and corresponding benefit, there are two
additional issues that remain concerning those resources. For
purposes of this Article, neither of these issues needs to be
resolved, but they should be identified.
In our system of insurance for tortious liability, there are a
number of mechanisms available to spread risk and compensation.
Any full-fledged scheme to ensure that there is appropriate
investment in safety must take into account the ex post nature of tort
law. 118 Defendants make the decision about their safely levels prior
to any determination concerning liability. As a result, there can be
substantial moral hazard and adverse selection problems unless the
tort and insurance systems are sufficiently coordinated to provide
the predictability, insurability, and accountability necessary to make
ex ante decisions that result in optimal deterrence. 119
XI. DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES
The question then arises of what to do with the number
determined to be the total societal harm caused by tortious
conduct. 120 How should that money be distributed? Again, it is
within the scope of this Article merely to raise the question, rather
than answer it.
The goal in any distribution process would involve appropriate
incentives to bring attention to tortious conduct, to make equitable
distribution of available resources both horizontally and vertically,
and to avoid windfalls. 121 There are a number of approaches that
could be taken. Under the existing tort system, compensation is on
a first-come, first-serve basis for compensatory damages. It would
certainly be possible to deduct any compensatory damages paid by
a tortious defendant from the total award of social damages. If
there were a risk of an eventual shortfall, there is any number of
partial distribution, pro rata, focused pro rata, or formal
118. See generally Guido Calabresi, The Complexity of Torts––The Case of
Punitive Damages, in EXPLORING TORT LAW 333, 345–46 (M. Stuart Madden
ed., 2005).
119. See generally TWERSKY & HENDERSON, supra note 72.
120. See Sharkey, supra note 66, at 351 (2003) (stating that “punitive
damages have been used to pursue not only the goals of retribution and
deterrence, but also to accomplish, however crudely, a societal compensation
goal: the redress of harms caused by defendants who injure persons beyond the
individual plaintiffs in a particular case”).
121. See McGovern, Claims Resolution Facilities, supra note 88, at 1366–67.
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distribution alternatives. 122 It is also possible to award money to
the state or use additional funds for cy pres awards. 123 There is vast
experience with the distribution methodology used in the global
settlement of mass tort claims that has generally been recognized
as appropriate when there is a single sum of money to be divided
among claimants. 124
For a tortious defendant, one of the major benefits of an
allocation and distribution of monies for all the harm caused by the
tortious conduct is finality. 125 Under this theory, once a
determination is made, either by trial or settlement, there would be
no recourse outside the established fund for a plaintiff to pursue a
defendant. The outcome would be analogous to bankruptcy in
terms of the protection afforded a defendant from further litigation
by the members of the class. 126
XII. CONCLUSION
The marriage of punitive damages and class actions has almost
inevitably ended in divorce. There are few cases approved by
appellate courts that have allowed a class action to include punitive
damages, and under existing Supreme Court jurisprudence there
are only a limited number of discrete factual situations where any
future class action may include punitive damages. In addition, this
jurisprudence has disincentivized both plaintiffs and defendants
from even attempting to use the class action device in this context
and has encouraged lawyers to look to alternative procedural paths
for seeking additional, exemplary, or punitive damages.
There are, however, several limited circumstances where there
could be appellate approval of a punitive damages class action.
These circumstances could occur, for example, in the context of a
federal class action involving a catastrophe in a single state where
all parties with similar and real relationships are included, the
elements of their causes of action are identical, damages are
financial and have been determined, the defendant has moved for
class certification of punitive damages, and the punitive damages

122. Id.
123. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION (Proposed
Final Draft 2009).
124. See McGovern, Claims Resolution Facilities, supra note 88, at 1381;
McGovern, UN Compensation, supra note 88; see also McGovern, Claims
Administration, supra note 114, at 109.
125. See McGovern, Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions, supra note 6.
126. 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(g) (2005); see also Francis E. McGovern, Settlement
of Mass Torts in a Federal System, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 871 (2001).
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as determined are commensurate with the reprehensibility of the
conduct.
From a purely theoretical perspective, another possible role for
a class action in punitive damages cases could materialize if a
court adopted a separate rationale for punitive damages based upon
economic arguments that damages for tortious conduct should be
fully borne by the tortfeasor in order to achieve optimal societal
deterrence. Under current tort law, only a small measure of the
total damages imposed by a tortious defendant on society as a
whole is paid by that defendant because such a small percentage of
the individual, affected plaintiffs bring lawsuits, resulting in
underdeterrence from the perspective of society. If a court were to
adopt a more global economic analysis and decide that those
defendants were liable for the entire amount of harm that they
cause, in order to achieve the appropriate balance of over and
under deterrence there would be an opportunity for the class action
device and an award of damages above and beyond the
compensatory damages for individual lawsuits. This award could
be determined with an analytical process commonly used in
business and similar to the Section 502(c) estimation process found
in the Bankruptcy Code. 127 Whether called “economic,” “extra
compensatory,” “exemplary,” or “punitive,” these global damages
would result in tortious defendants being held responsible for all
the harm they cause rather than only the subset of harm calculated
from the damages won by opportunistic plaintiffs. Rather than
using the ill-fitting “punishment damages” moniker for performing
the economic function of forcing defendants to internalize the costs
of their tortious activities, the same outcome could be achieved by
a combination of class action, estimation, and societal damages. In
addition to the available methodologies to calculate the appropriate
benefit from an optimal allegation of resources for safety, there is
also any number of methods available for the distribution of those
resources associated with that benefit. The suggestion here is not a
normative one, but, in the spirit of the Symposium, an exploration
of possible scenarios that could conceivably occur in the future.
This combination of class actions and punitive damages would
occur only if traditional legal doctrines of punitive damages are
redefined to fit a paradigm consistent with the law and economics
rationale.

127. 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (2006).

